From 57f7c5667f85e311fa1c3580e5fc25656908bcdd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "google-labs-jules[bot]" <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2026 01:56:08 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F=20Sentinel:=20[HIGH]=20Im?= =?UTF-8?q?plement=20strict=20email=20validation?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - Implemented `isValidEmail` utility with strict regex validation (rejects `<` and `>`) to prevent XSS vectors. - Updated `Contact.tsx` to use `isValidEmail` instead of weak regex. - Added comprehensive tests for `isValidEmail` in `src/utils/security.test.ts`. - Fixed flaky test in `src/pages/__tests__/Contact.test.tsx` by clearing `localStorage` in `afterEach`. - Added test case for invalid email submission. - Documented findings in `.jules/sentinel.md`. Co-authored-by: ragusa-it <196988693+ragusa-it@users.noreply.github.com> --- .jules/sentinel.md | 10 +++++ src/pages/Contact.tsx | 4 +- src/pages/__tests__/Contact.test.tsx | 23 ++++++++++++ src/utils/security.test.ts | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/utils/security.ts | 18 +++++++++ 5 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/utils/security.test.ts diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md index a98cbd0..4b69a9a 100644 --- a/.jules/sentinel.md +++ b/.jules/sentinel.md @@ -7,3 +7,13 @@ **Vulnerability:** Contact forms using client-side services (like EmailJS) without backend middleware are vulnerable to spam and quota exhaustion. **Learning:** While true rate limiting requires a backend, client-side throttling via `localStorage` provides a necessary friction layer for legitimate users and simple bots, protecting external service quotas. **Prevention:** Implement reusable rate-limit hooks for all public-facing form submissions in static/serverless applications. + +## 2026-02-13 - State Leakage in Tests masking Security Failures +**Vulnerability:** Flaky tests caused by `localStorage` state leakage (e.g. rate limits persisting between tests) can prevent security features from being properly verified, leading to false negatives or untested paths. +**Learning:** Global state like `localStorage` must be explicitly cleared in `afterEach` blocks in test environments (jsdom). Failing to do so can cause subsequent tests to fail or behave unpredictably, especially for rate-limiting logic. +**Prevention:** Always include `localStorage.clear()` in `afterEach` (or `beforeEach`) when testing components that rely on local storage. + +## 2026-02-13 - Strict Email Validation vs HTML5 Validation +**Vulnerability:** Standard email regexes and HTML5 validation are often too permissive, allowing XSS vectors (like `'; + const expected = '<script>alert("XSS")</script>'; + expect(sanitizeInput(input)).toBe(expected); + }); + }); + + describe('isValidEmail', () => { + it('accepts valid email addresses', () => { + expect(isValidEmail('test@example.com')).toBe(true); + expect(isValidEmail('john.doe@sub.domain.co.uk')).toBe(true); + expect(isValidEmail('user+tag@example.com')).toBe(true); + }); + + it('rejects invalid email formats', () => { + expect(isValidEmail('plainaddress')).toBe(false); + expect(isValidEmail('@example.com')).toBe(false); + expect(isValidEmail('user@')).toBe(false); + expect(isValidEmail('user@.com')).toBe(false); + expect(isValidEmail('user@com')).toBe(false); // Missing dot in domain part (simple regex might allow, but strict one requires dot) + }); + + it('rejects emails with dangerous characters (<, >)', () => { + expect(isValidEmail('