15c4b88535
- Updates `isValidEmail` to strictly reject double quotes and backticks while allowing apostrophes. - Applies `sanitizeInput` to email fields in Contact form payload (Defense in Depth). - Adds tests for email validation edge cases. - Updates Sentinel journal. Co-authored-by: ragusa-it <196988693+ragusa-it@users.noreply.github.com>
25 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
25 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
## 2025-02-12 - Missing Security Headers in Firebase Config
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**Vulnerability:** The application is served without standard security headers (CSP, X-Frame-Options, etc.), leaving it vulnerable to XSS, Clickjacking, and MIME sniffing.
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**Learning:** Single Page Applications (SPAs) served via static hosting (like Firebase) rely on infrastructure configuration for security headers, which are often overlooked. Default configurations are rarely secure enough.
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**Prevention:** Always configure `firebase.json` (or equivalent) with strict security headers (CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS, etc.) at project setup.
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## 2026-01-26 - Client-Side Rate Limiting for Serverless Forms
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**Vulnerability:** Contact forms using client-side services (like EmailJS) without backend middleware are vulnerable to spam and quota exhaustion.
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**Learning:** While true rate limiting requires a backend, client-side throttling via `localStorage` provides a necessary friction layer for legitimate users and simple bots, protecting external service quotas.
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**Prevention:** Implement reusable rate-limit hooks for all public-facing form submissions in static/serverless applications.
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## 2026-02-13 - State Leakage in Tests masking Security Failures
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**Vulnerability:** Flaky tests caused by `localStorage` state leakage (e.g. rate limits persisting between tests) can prevent security features from being properly verified, leading to false negatives or untested paths.
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**Learning:** Global state like `localStorage` must be explicitly cleared in `afterEach` blocks in test environments (jsdom). Failing to do so can cause subsequent tests to fail or behave unpredictably, especially for rate-limiting logic.
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**Prevention:** Always include `localStorage.clear()` in `afterEach` (or `beforeEach`) when testing components that rely on local storage.
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## 2026-02-13 - Strict Email Validation vs HTML5 Validation
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**Vulnerability:** Standard email regexes and HTML5 validation are often too permissive, allowing XSS vectors (like `<script>`) in email fields if not properly sanitized/rejected.
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**Learning:** While HTML5 browsers block some invalid emails, relying solely on them is insufficient for defense-in-depth. Application-level validation should explicitly reject dangerous characters (`<`, `>`) to prevent stored XSS or injection if the data is processed by less-secure backends.
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**Prevention:** Implement strict, reusable validation functions (`isValidEmail`) that reject XSS vectors, and ensure tests verify this logic by bypassing browser validation if necessary.
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## 2026-02-14 - Strict Email Regex vs RFC Compliance
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**Vulnerability:** Standard email validation often allows characters like quotes (`"`) or backticks (`` ` ``) which can be vectors for XSS in HTML attribute contexts.
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**Learning:** While RFCs allow quoted local parts (e.g., `"user"@example.com`), these are rare in practice and pose significant security risks in web applications. It is often safer to explicitly reject them. However, apostrophes (`'`) are common in names (O'Connor) and should be allowed, relying on sanitization (Defense in Depth) rather than validation to handle them safely.
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**Prevention:** Use a hybrid approach: Strict validation (reject quotes/backticks) for high-risk characters, coupled with output sanitization (`sanitizeInput`) for characters that must be allowed but are still risky (apostrophes).
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